Abstract. In this paper we show how to use a Tug-of-War game to obtain existence of a viscosity solution to the infinity laplacian with nonhomogeneous mixed boundary conditions. For a Lipschitz and positive function g there exists a viscosity solution of the mixed boundary value problem, 8 > < > :
Introduction
Our main goal in this paper is to show that Tug-of-War games are a useful tool to obtain existence of solutions for nonlinear elliptic PDEs. More concretely, we will show existence of a viscosity solution to We have to emphasize that the proof of the existence of a solution of (1.1) is not trivial. Indeed, if we want to use PDE methods we realize that the problem is not variational and moreover, it is not clear if there is a maximum (or comparison) principle for viscosity solutions to this problem, therefore Perron's method is not applicable. Furthermore, this problem is not the limit as p → ∞ of the natural mixed boundary value problem for the p−Laplacian, −∆ p u p = 0 in Ω, u p = 0 on Γ D and |∇u p | p−2 ∂up ∂n = g on Γ N (note that this is the natural Neumann boundary condition associated to −∆ p u p ). It will be interesting to get a proof of existence for (1.1) using only PDE tools.
Through this paper we will use the 1−homogeneous version of the infinity Laplacian, which is the operator that appears naturally in connection with game theory. Let us recall that it is given by
This definition is valid when ∇u(x) = 0 but it needs some technical extension when ∇u(x) = 0, see Section 4.
Notice that, formally, ∆ ∞ u is the second derivative of u in the direction of the gradient. In fact, if u is a C 2 function and we take a direction v, then the second derivative of u in the direction of v is
If ∇u(x) = 0, we can take v = ∇u(x) |∇u(x)| , and get ∆ ∞ u(x) = D 2 v u(x).
Infinity harmonic functions (solutions to −∆ ∞ u = 0) appear naturally as limits of p−harmonic functions (solutions to −∆ p u = −div(|∇u| p−2 ∇u) = 0) and have applications to optimal transport problems, image processing, etc. See [4] , [7] , [10] and references therein. In this case it is equivalent to take the 3−homogeneous version of the infinity Laplacian, namely, ∆ ∞ u(x) = D 2 u(x)∇u(x), ∇u(x) . It is known that the problem −∆ ∞ u = 0 with a Dirichlet datum, u = F on ∂Ω has a unique viscosity solution, (as proved in [12] , and in a more general framework, in [18] ). Moreover, it is the unique AMLE (absolutely minimal Lipschitz extension) of F : Γ D → R in the sense that Lip U (u) = Lip ∂U ∩Ω (u) for every open set U ⊂ Ω \ Γ D . AMLE extensions were introduced by Aronsson in [3] , see the survey [4] for more references and applications of this subject.
Tug-of-War games. A Tug-of-War is a two-person, zero-sum game, that is, two players are in contest and the total earnings of one are the losses of the other. Hence, one of them, say Player I, plays trying to maximize his expected outcome, while the other, say Player II is trying to minimize Player I's outcome (or, since the game is zero-sum, to maximize his own outcome). Recently, these type of games have been used in connection with some PDE problems, see [6] , [15] , [17] , [18] . For the reader's convenience, let us first describe briefly the game introduced in [18] by Y. Peres, O. Schramm, S. Sheffield and D. Wilson. Consider a bounded domain Ω ⊂ R n , and take Γ D ⊂ ∂Ω and Γ N ≡ ∂Ω \ Γ D . Let F : Γ D → R be a Lipschitz continuous function. At an initial time, a token is placed at a point x 0 ∈ Ω \ Γ D . Then, a (fair) coin is tossed and the winner of the toss is allowed to move the game position to any x 1 ∈ B ǫ (x 0 ) ∩ Ω. At each turn, the coin is tossed again, and the winner chooses a new game state x k ∈ B ǫ (x k−1 ) ∩ Ω. Once the token has reached some x τ ∈ Γ D , the game ends and Player I earns F (x τ ) (while Player II earns −F (x τ )). This is the reason why we will refer to F as the final payoff function. It is considered also a running payoff, f (x) > 0, defined in Ω, which represents the reward (respectively, the cost) at each intermediate state x. This procedure gives a sequence of game states x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x τ , where every x k except x 0 are random variables, depending on the coin tosses and the strategies adopted by the players. Now we want to give a definition of the value of the game. To this end we introduce some notation and the normal or strategic form of the game (see [17] and [16] ). The initial state x 0 ∈ Ω \ Γ D is known to both players (public knowledge). Each player i chooses an action a i 0 ∈ B ǫ (0); this defines an action profile a 0 = {a 1 0 , a 2 0 } ∈ B ǫ (0) × B ǫ (0) which is announced to the other player. Then, the new state x 1 ∈ B ǫ (x 0 ) (namely, the current state plus the action) is selected according to the distribution p(·|x 0 , a 0 ) in Ω. At stage k, knowing the history h k = (x 0 , a 0 , x 1 , a 1 , . . . , a k−1 , x k ), (the sequence of states and actions up to that stage), each player i chooses an action a i k . If the game ends at time j < k, we set x m = x j and a m = 0 for j ≤ m ≤ k. The current state x k and the profile
the set of histories up to stage k, and by H = k≥1 H k the set of all histories. Notice that H k , as a product space, has a measurable structure. The complete history space H ∞ is the set of plays defined as infinite sequences (x 0 , a 0 , . . . , a k−1 , x k , . . .) endowed with the product topology. Then, the final payoff for Player I, i.e. F , induces a Borel-measurable function on H ∞ . A pure strategy S i = {S k i } k for Player i, is a sequence of mappings from histories to actions, namely, a mapping from H to B ǫ (0) such that S k i is a Borel-measurable mapping from H k to B ǫ (0) that maps histories ending with x k to elements of B ǫ (0) (roughly speaking, at every stage the strategy gives the next movement for the player, provided he win the coin toss, as a function of the current state and the past history). The initial state x 0 and a profile of strategies {S I , S II } define (by Kolmogorov's extension theorem) a unique probability P x 0 S I ,S II on the space of plays H ∞ . We denote by E x 0 S I ,S II the corresponding expectation.
Then, if S I and S II denote the strategies adopted by Player I and II respectively, we define the expected payoff for Player I as
, if the game terminates a.s.
+∞,
otherwise.
Analogously, we define the expected payoff for Player II as
The ǫ-value of the game for Player I is given by
while the ǫ-value of the game for Player II is defined as
In some sense, u ǫ I (x 0 ), u ǫ II (x 0 ) are the least possible outcomes that each player expects to get when the ǫ-game starts at x 0 . Notice that, as in [18] , we penalize severely the games that never end.
If u ǫ I = u ǫ II := u ǫ , we say that the game has a value. In [18] it is shown that under very general hypotheses, that are fulfilled in the present setting, the ǫ-Tug-of-War game has a value.
Note that it is essential that the running payoff is strictly positive or identically zero in Ω in order to have a value of the game, see [18] for a counterexample. This fact imposes the restriction that g must be positive on Γ N . We have to mention that in [2] the authors propose a suitable modification of the game that gives existence of a continuous solution assuming only that the payoff is nonnegative. Uniqueness is only known for strictly positive (or zero) running payoff (from the results in [18] ).
In [18] , [17] and [8] , the limit as ǫ → 0 is studied and it is proved there that when the running payoff is of order ǫ 2 , they consider f (x) = ǫ 2 a(x), then u(x) = lim ǫ→0 u ǫ (x) exists and is a solution to
Let us to point out that the arguments that we develop here allow to fix an easily solvable mistake in our previous work [8] , see Remark 11.
As we have mentioned our main task here is to obtain a non-homogeneous Neumann boundary condition, hence we consider a running payoff of the form
Note that f (x) is strictly positive in Ω and concentrates as ǫ → 0 in a small strip of width ǫ near Γ N . Also note that our running cost f (x) has size ǫ × ǫ 2 for d(x, Γ N ) > ǫ (this will give a solution to ∆ ∞ u(x) = 0 in Ω) and ǫ −1 g(x)
2 ǫ 2 for d(x, Γ N ) ≤ ǫ (this part will become singular giving ∂u ∂n (x) = g(x) on Γ N when passing to the limit). Finally let us observe that ǫ 2 is the homogeneity associated to a change of scale in the 1-homogeneous infinity Laplacian, while ǫ is the homogeneity associated with ∂u ∂n . For technical reasons we also have to assume that the final payoff F is zero, F = 0. This hypothesis is used to find the estimates for u ǫ collected in Section 3. We also use there the convexity of Ω.
Note that, since the running payoff is strictly positive, f > 0, and the final payoff is zero, F = 0, we have that the value of the game is nonnegative, u ǫ ≥ 0.
One of the main properties of the ǫ−values of the game is the so called Dynamic Programming Principle, that in this case reads as follows:
for every x ∈Ω \ Γ D , where B ǫ (x) denotes the open ball of radius ǫ centered at x and f is given by (1.3).
This property follows from the probabilistic interpretation of the u ǫ , since Player I and Player II have the same probability of winning the coin toss at the point x, and the running payoff gives the amount received at the point x. In particular, when the running payoff is zero, the Dynamic Programming Principle is some kind of mean value property for the ǫ− values of the game.
As we will prove, these ǫ−values converge uniformly (along subsequences) when ǫ → 0. The uniform limit as ǫ → 0 of the game values u ǫ is called the continuous value of the game, that we will denote by u.
One of the most delicate points in this paper is to show that this continuos value of the game exists. To this end, since the ǫ-values of the game have an inf-sup or sup-inf expression, we can get the required estimates considering prescribed strategies for Player II (or Player I) and using a comparison argument from [18] .
In the analysis performed in [18] this convergence result is proved considering modified dyadic games (on scales ǫ and 2ǫ) that are favorable to one of the two players and then proving that monotonicity holds for those modified games. In our case it is difficult to adapt this argument because the size of the strip where the running payoff is of size ǫ, d(x, Γ N ) ≤ ǫ, changes with ǫ. This fact implies that the dyadic modifications of the game as in [18] no longer yield a monotone sequence. Hence we have to introduce a different argument that is based on a uniform bound for the u ǫ (note that this is not immediate since we have a running payoff with 2ǫ −2 max x f (x) = ǫ −1 max x g, that is unbounded as ǫ → 0) together with a modification of the classical AscoliArzela's Lemma (taking into account that in general the involved functions u ǫ are not continuous).
From [18] , it turns out that u is a viscosity solution to the problem −∆ ∞ u = 0 in Ω and clearly, u = 0 on Γ D . The second main point of this paper is to show that in the limit we get the nonhomogeneous Neumann boundary condition ∂u ∂n = g on Γ N . We have the following result Theorem 1. Let Ω be a bounded, convex and smooth domain, Γ N a subdomain of ∂Ω, and Γ D = ∂Ω \ Γ N . Let g(x) a positive Lipschitz function defined on Γ N . Consider u ǫ the value of the Tug-of-War game described above. Then, there exists a subsequence, u ǫ j , that converges uniformly to a Lipschitz continuous limit u that is a viscosity solution to the mixed boundary value problem
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we analyze this Tug-of-War games in an interval (this analysis will provide some insight on why the size of the running payoff is the right one), in Section 3 we prove that the sequence u ǫ has a compactness property that allows us to pass to the limit, and finally in Section 4 we prove that this limit is a viscosity solution of (1.1). We leave to the Appendix the proof of a compactness result (a variant of Ascoli-Arzela's Lemma).
The 1 − d game
Let us analyze in detail the one-dimensional game and its limit as ǫ → 0.
We set Ω = (0, 1) and play the ǫ−game. To simplify we assume that the running payoff is concentrated at one end. That is, we end the game at x = 0 (with zero final payoff) and we impose a running payoff at the interval (1 − ǫ, 1] of amount ǫg(1)/2 > 0 and, to begin with, zero in the rest of the interval. Note that, since the running payoff is not strictly positive, the general result from [18] does not apply and hence we cannot assert the existence of a value for this game. Nevertheless, in this simple 1 − d case we can obtain the existence of such value by direct computations. For the moment, let us assume that there exists a value that we call u ǫ and proceed, in several steps, with the analysis of this sequence of functions u ǫ for ǫ small. All the calculations below hold both for u ǫ I and for u ǫ II .
Step 1. u ǫ (0) = 0.
Step 2. u ǫ is increasing in x and strictly positive in (0, 1].
Indeed, if x < y then for every pair of strategies S I , S II for Player I and II beginning at x we can construct strategies beginning at y in such a way that
(here x i,x and x i,y are the positions of the game after i movements beginning at x and y respectively). Indeed, just reproduce the movements shifting points by y − x when possible (if not, that is, if the jump is too large and ends outside the interval, just remain at the larger interior position x = 1).
Taking expectations, infimum and supremum, it follows that
Note that for two sequences of positions x i,x ≤ x i,y (corresponding to the same sequence coin tosses) we have that the game with the first sequence ends before the second and the number of times that the position of the game enters into (1 − ǫ, 1] is greater for the second. Now, we just observe that there is a positive probability of obtaining a sequence of 1/ǫ consecutive heads (exactly 2 −1/ǫ ), hence the probability of reaching the interval where a positive running payoff is paid is strictly positive. Therefore,
for every x = 0.
Step 3. In this one dimensional case it is easy to identify the optimal strategies for players I and II: to jump ǫ to the right for Player I and to jump ǫ to the left for Player II. That is, if we are at x, the optimal strategies lead to x → min{x + ǫ, 1} for Player I, and to x → max{x − ǫ, 0} for Player II.
This follows from step 2, where we have proved that the function u ǫ is increasing in x. As a consequence, the optimal strategies follow: for instance, Player I will choose the point where the expected payoff is maximized and this is given by min{x + ǫ, 1},
This is also clear from the following intuitive fact: player I wants to maximize the payoff (reaching the interval (1 − ǫ, 1]) and player II wants the game to end as soon as possible (hence pointing to 0).
Step 4. u ǫ is constant in every interval of the form (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ) for k = 1, ..., N (we denote by N the total number of such intervals in (0, 1]).
Indeed, from step 3 we know what are the optimal strategies for both players, and hence the result follows noticing that the number of steps that one has to advance to reach zero (or the payoff interval (1 − ǫ, 1]) is the same for every point in (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ). Remark 1. Note that u ǫ is necessarily discontinuos at every point of the form y k = kǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Step 5. Let us call a k := u ǫ | (kǫ,(k+1)ǫ) . Then we have
for every i = 2, ..., N − 1, and
Notice that these identities follow from the Dynamic Programming Principle as stated in the introduction.
Using again that from step 3 we know the optimal strategies, that from step 4 u ǫ is constant in every subinterval of the form (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ) and that there is a final payoff in the last interval of amount ǫg(1)/2, we immediately get the conclusion.
Remark 2. Note the similarity with a finite difference scheme used to solve u xx = 0 in (0, 1) with boundary conditions u(0) = 0 and u x (1) = g (1) . In fact, a discretization of this problem in a uniform mesh of size ǫ leads to the same formulas obtained in step 5.
Step 6. We have
Indeed, the constants a k = ǫg(1)k are the unique solution to the formulas obtained in step 5.
Remark 3. Since formula (2.1) is in fact valid for u ǫ I and u ǫ II , this proves that the game has a value.
Remark 4. Note that u ǫ verifies that
for every x > y with x − y > ǫ.
In this one dimensional case, we can pass to the limit directly, by using the explicit formula for u ǫ (see Step 7 below). However, in the n-dimensional case there is no explicit formula, and then we will need a compactness result, which is proved in Theorem 3 (see the Appendix).
Step 7.
lim
Indeed, this follows from the explicit formula for u ǫ in every interval of the form (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ) found in step 6 and from the monotonicity stated in step 2 (to take care of the values of u ǫ at points of the form kǫ, we have
Remark 5. Note that from these results it follows that the functions u ǫ are uniformly bounded for ǫ small, in fact,
for every ǫ small enough.
Remark 6. Note that the limit function
is the unique viscosity (and classical) solution to
with boundary conditions
.
Remark 7.
Notice that an alternative approach to the previous analysis can be done by using the theory of Markov chains.
Running payoff given by (1.3). In the case we have a running payoff given by
which is strictly positive in [0.1] and hence by [18] there exists the value of this game, u ǫ . Now we can argue almost exactly as before at steps 1 to 5, therefore we omit details. The only difference is that the running payoff changes the equations for the a k and we have
Now we have to modify the previous Step 6. Let us look for a solution a k of the form
Of course we have a 0 = 0.
For every k = 1, ..., N − 1 we need
that is,
Simplifying this expression we get
that holds true for any choice of Θ.
The last equation reads as
That is,
which is equivalent to,
Hence we need,
From this we find the value of Θ, using that ǫN = 1,
Therefore, we conclude that it holds
and hence, from the explicit formula for u ǫ in every interval of the form (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ) and using that Θ verifies that lim ǫ→0 Θ = g(1), we conclude
3. The n-dimensional case: estimates for u ǫ
In this section we prove some estimates, based in arguments from game theory, that allow us to show that u ǫ converge uniformly along subsequences ǫ j → 0 to a Lipschitz continuous limit u. We remark again that proving uniform convergence is not an easy task since u ǫ are in general discontinuous functions, c.f. the previous section.
Notation and description of the setting:
To get an estimate for the sequence {u ǫ }, we will use that these functions are defined as an sup-inf (or equivalently as inf-sup). Let us fix a point x 0 in the domain Ω. Let us also denote by K the maximum of
2 and, in a first stage of the game, assume that the running payoff is much more favourable to Player I, and it is given by
With this new running payoff, we play a first stage of the game which ends when the position reaches the point x 0 , with final payoff 0. Once the position reaches x 0 , and this happens almost surely, since for this modified game this point is the natural target for Player I, the game follows as usual, without any restriction on the strategies and with the original running payoff and final states (on Γ D ).
Main task: Assuming that the modified game starts from a point y 0 , to find a bound for the value of the first part of the game, we call it v, in terms of the distance |x 0 − y 0 |, K and the diameter of Ω but we want it to be independent of ǫ for ǫ small enough.
For points x in Ω that do not lie in the strip, dynamic programming principle holds. That is, the value of the game in Ω, v, (we omit the subscript ǫ to simplify the notation) verifies
For points x ∈ Ω that are in the strip of width ǫ around Γ N the dynamic programming principle is different, since the running payoff is much larger, and the ball of radius ǫ may not be contained in the domain Ω. Therefore, in this case the dynamic programming principle gives
To estimate v we will look for a suitable supersolution. Consider
We want to choose C 1 and C 2 in such a way that v is a supersolution to the dynamic programming principle, (3.2)-(3.3), that is, we want to obtain a " ≥ " in both equations.
Case 1. Concerning (3.2), we have
Case 2. We have to check (3.3), and at this point, the geometry of the domain has to be taken into account. We assume that there exists a constant c (that only depends on Ω), that bounds the maximum distance from x 0 that can be reached by Player I. Definition 1. Given a point x 0 ∈ Ω we say that it satisfies the transversality condition with constant c > 0, if and only if for any point y ∈ ∂Ω, y = x 0 , it holds
where n(y) denotes the unit outwards normal at the point y.
Remark 8. Note that if Ω is strictly convex, there exists a uniform transversality constant c. However, if ∂Ω contains flat pieces, the transversality constant becomes 0 at some points, see Figure 1 .
Hence, if we are at a point x in the strip, when we look at the positions in the ball B ǫ (x) ∩ Ω, the minimum of the distance to x 0 is |x 0 − x| − ǫ, while the maximum of this distance is bounded by |x 0 − x| + cǫ. Therefore, to get an inequality in (3.3), we need to compute
This indeed holds for ǫ small if we choose C 1 = 
Remark 9. This estimate is valid as long as |y 0 − x 0 | > ǫ. Moreover, this is natural since, as was shown in the previous section, in the one-dimensional case, v(y 0 ) is bounded from below by a strictly positive constant (depending on ǫ).
An estimate for u: Let u ǫ (x) be a game as described in the introduction. We have
where v is as before. This estimate follows by prescribing that the second player plays with a strategy in the family S * II of strategies which consists on pointing to x 0 until the game reaches this position, and then continue the game from the starting position x 0 . By simplicity of writing, we will use the same symbol S * II to denote the family of such strategies, and any particular element in this family. For any δ > 0 there exists a particular strategy S δ I for Player I, such that
Notice that the fact that F = 0 and g > 0 implies that, in this case, the "good strategies" (in the sense that they are close to realize the supremum) for Player I do not allow to end the game jumping to a point in Γ D . In any case, if the game ends during this first stage, we trivially obtain that
For the second part of the game, once we arrive to x 0 , we can fix a quasioptimal strategy for Player II, in the set of strategies S * II , that we denote by S δ II . Calling τ * the first time where the game reaches x 0 ,
Here we have selected S δ I and S δ II such that and
Since δ is arbitrary we conclude (3.6).
When the transversality condition holds, using our previous estimate for v, we get
By a symmetric argument we obtain
for every y 0 , x 0 such that |y 0 − x 0 | > ǫ, and such that the transversality condition in Ω holds. Note that when Ω is strictly convex the transversality condition holds for every x 0 , y 0 in Ω, assuming |y 0 − x 0 | > ǫ. Therefore, our enemy at this point is that the boundary can have flat pieces (recall that we have assumed only that Ω is convex). See Remark 8.
In Figure 1 we show possible movements of the first stage of the game according to Player I wins, x I k+1 , or Player II wins, x II k+1 . Player I tries to move far away from x 0 while Player II aims to reach x 0 . Notice that when the domain is strictly convex then Player I can not move a distance ǫ away from x 0 when x k lies in the strip; while this is possible when the boundary ∂Ω has flat pieces, the risk being the fact that when Player II uses the strategy of pointing to x 0 at every position then the states of the game can be traped in the strip. Our next task is to extend the estimate to convex domains that may have flat pieces on its boundary.
If the transversality condition does not hold we argue as follows: we choose a point x 1 in the interior of the domain with the required transversality condition for y 0 and x 1 and for x 0 and x 1 . It suffices to take In Figure 2 , we draw a possible location of x 0 and y 0 for which the transversality condition is not satisfied. Note that when pointing to x 0 Player II remains in the strip a large number of times. We also depicted a possible location of the point x 1 mentioned above. Note that when playing with the strategy of pointing to x 1 we leave the strip immediately after at most a finite number (independent of ǫ) of consecutive winnings of Player II.
Then we obtain that there exists a constant C (depending on K and the geometry of Ω trough the constants in the transversality condition but not on ǫ) such that
This estimate allows us to conclude two results: Lemma 1. Let u ǫ be the value of the game described in the introduction, then there exists a constant C 1 (depending on g and Ω but not on ǫ) such that
Proof. It is enough to use (3.8) twice (if necessary) with y 0 an arbitrary point in Ω and two points x 1 0 , x 2 0 ∈ Γ D with |x 1 0 − x 2 0 | >> ǫ and recall that u ǫ (x i 0 ) = 0 to obtain the desired bound. Lemma 2. Let u ǫ be the value of the game described in the introduction, then there exists a constant C 2 (depending on g and Ω but not on ǫ) such that
for all x, x 0 such that |y 0 − x 0 | > ǫ.
Proof. Immediate from (3.8).
Remark 10. This result is analogous to Lemma 3.2 in [18] . However, due to the fact that our running payoff is of order ǫ (much bigger than ǫ 2 ) in the strip near Γ N we need a different argument for the proof. Also note that since our running payoff is of order ǫ 3 (much smaller than ǫ 2 ) outside the strip we find as supersolution a cone plus a correction of order ǫ (see (3.5)), hence Lemma 3.2 in [18] is not a consequence of our results.
Therefore we fall into the hypotheses of the variant of the Ascoli-Arzela's compactness lemma (see the Appendix) and we conclude that u ǫ converge uniformly taking a subsequence if necessary. This proves the first part of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let u ǫ denote the value of the game described in the introduction, then there exists a subsequence ǫ j and a Lipschitz continuous function u, such that u ǫ j → u uniformly in Ω.
Proof. Thanks to Lemmas 1 and 2 we can apply Theorem 3 in the Appendix with modulus of continuity ω(s) = C 2 |s|. Hence there is a subsequence u ǫ j that converges uniformly in Ω to a limit with the same modulus of continuity.
The continuous value of the game is a viscosity solution to the mixed problem
As we have already mentioned in the Introduction, it is shown in [18] that the continuous value of the game u is infinity harmonic within Ω and, in the case that Γ D = ∂Ω, it satisfies a Dirichlet boundary condition u = 0 on ∂Ω.
In this paper, we are concerned with the case in which ∂Ω = Γ D ∪ Γ N with Γ N = ∅. Our aim in the present section is to prove that u satisfies an homogeneous Neumann boundary condition on Γ N , namely
For completeness we will include here the full proof of the fact that u is a solution to
in the viscosity sense. As stated in the introduction the precise definition of the 1−homogeneous infinity Laplacian needs some care. We will consider
In defining ∆ ∞ u we have followed [18] . Let us point out that it is possible to define the infinity laplacian at points with zero gradient in an alternative way, as in [13] . However, it is easy to see that both definitions are equivalent.
To motivate the above definition, the starting point is that ∆ ∞ u is the second derivative of u in the direction of the gradient, as it is said in the introduction. In points where ∇u(x) = 0, no direction is preferred to take second derivatives, and then expression (4.2) arises from the second-order Taylor's expansion of u at the point x,
We say that, at these points,
Because of the singular nature of (4.2) in points where ∇u(x) = 0, we have to restrict our class of test functions. We will denote S(x) = φ ∈ C 2 near x for which ∆ ∞ φ(x) has been defined , this is, φ ∈ S(x) if φ ∈ C 2 in a neighborhood of x and either ∇φ(x) = 0 or ∇φ(x) = 0 and the limit
exists.
Now, using the above discussion of the infinity laplacian, we give the precise definition of viscosity solution to (4.1) following [5] .
Definition 2.
Consider the boundary value problem (4.1). Then, (1) A lower semi-continuous function u is a viscosity supersolution if for every φ ∈ S(x 0 ) such that u − φ has a strict minimum at the point x 0 ∈ Ω with u(x 0 ) = φ(x 0 ) we have: If x 0 ∈ Γ N , the inequality
with ∆ ∞ φ(x 0 ) given by (4.2), and if
An upper semi-continuous function u is a subsolution if for every φ ∈ S(x 0 ) such that u − φ has a strict maximum at the point x 0 ∈ Ω with u(x 0 ) = φ(x 0 ) we have: If x 0 ∈ Γ N , the inequality
Finally, u is a viscosity solution if it is both a super-and a subsolution.
Let us recall the result that we have at this point: the sequence u ǫ contains a uniformly convergent subsequence (that by simplicity we will denote by u ǫ ) with limit a Lipschitz function u. To end the proof of Theorem 1 we have to identify the problem verified by u.
End of the proof of Theorem 1. The starting point is the Dynamic Programming Principle, which is satisfied by the value of the ǫ−game:
for every x ∈Ω \ Γ D , where B ǫ (x) denotes the open ball of radius ǫ centered at x and ω ǫ is the small strip near Γ N given by
Let us check that u (a uniform limit of the subsequence that we still denote by u ǫ ) is a viscosity supersolution to (4.1). To this end, consider a function φ ∈ S(x 0 ) such that u − φ has a strict local minimum at x 0 , this is,
Without loss of generality, we can suppose that φ(x 0 ) = u(x 0 ). Let us see the inequality that these test functions satisfy, as a consequence of the Dynamic Programming Principle. For a sequence ǫ → 0 we can choose a sequence of positive numbers η = η(ǫ) = o(ǫ 2 ). Then, by the uniform convergence of u ǫ to u, there exist a sequence x ǫ → x 0 such that
for every x in a fixed neighborhood of x 0 . From (4.4), we deduce
and inf
Then, we have from (4.3)
The above expression can be read as an aproximated Dynamic Programming Principle in the viscosity sense.
It is clear that the uniform limit of u ǫ , u, verifies
In Ω \ Γ D there are two possibilities: x 0 ∈ Ω and x 0 ∈ Γ N . In the former case we have to check that
while in the latter, what we have to prove is
CASE A First, assume that x 0 ∈ Ω.
In this case, we just observe that for ǫ small the points x 0 and x ǫ belong to Ω \ ω ǫ . In addition we can assume that B ǫ (x ǫ ) ∩ ω ǫ = ∅ (considering ǫ smaller if necessary). Now we use ideas from [8] .
If ∇φ(x 0 ) = 0 we proceed as follows. Since ∇φ(x 0 ) = 0 we also have ∇φ(x ǫ ) = 0 for ǫ small enough.
In the sequel, x ǫ 1 , x ǫ 2 ∈Ω will be the points such that φ(x We remark that x ǫ 1 , x ǫ 2 ∈ ∂B ǫ (x ǫ ). Suppose to the contrary that there exists a subsequence x ǫ j 1 ∈ B ǫ j (x ǫ j ) of maximum points of φ. Then, ∇φ(x ǫ j 1 ) = 0 and, since x ǫ j 1 → x 0 as ǫ j → 0, we have by continuity that ∇φ(x 0 ) = 0, a contradiction. The argument for x ǫ 2 is similar. Hence, since B ǫ (x ǫ ) ∩ ∂Ω = ∅, we have
as ǫ → 0. This can be deduced from the fact that, for ǫ small enough φ is approximately the same as its tangent plane.
In fact, if we write x ǫ 1 = x ǫ + ǫv ǫ with |v ǫ | = 1, and we fix any direction w, then the Taylor expansion of φ gives
for any direction w. This implies
Now, consider the Taylor expansion of second order of φ
as |y − x ǫ | → 0. Evaluating the above expansion at the point at which φ attains its minimum in B ǫ (x ǫ ), x ǫ 2 , we get
as ǫ → 0.
Evaluating at its symmetric point in the ball B ǫ (x ǫ ), that is given by
Adding both expressions we obtain
We observe that, by our choice of x ǫ 2 as the point where the minimum is attained, using (4.5), and estimating φ(x ǫ 2 ) by max y∈Bǫ(x)∩Ω φ(y),
Note that from (4.8) we get
Then we get, dividing by ǫ 2 and passing to the limit,
Now, if ∇φ(x 0 ) = 0 we can argue exactly as above and moreover, we can suppose (considering a subsequence) that
by definition, since φ ∈ S(x 0 ).
CASE B
Suppose that x 0 ∈ Γ N . There are four sub-cases to be considered depending on the direction of the gradient ∇φ(x 0 ) and the distance of the points x ǫ to the boundary.
where
is well defined since φ ∈ S(x 0 ).
Therefore, we conclude that we can always assume in the sequel (cases 2,3,4) that ∂φ ∂n
and hence we get
CASE 2: lim inf ǫ→0 dist(x ǫ , ∂Ω) ǫ > 1, and ∇φ(x 0 ) = 0.
Since ∇φ(x 0 ) = 0 we also have ∇φ(x ǫ ) = 0 for ǫ small enough. Hence, since B ǫ (x ǫ ) ∩ ∂Ω = ∅, we have, as before,
as ǫ → 0. Notice that both x ǫ 1 , x ǫ 2 → ∂B ǫ (x ǫ ). This can be deduced from the fact that, for ǫ small enough φ is approximately the same as its tangent plane.
Then we can argue exactly as before (when x 0 ∈ Ω) to obtain that 0 ≤ −∆ ∞ φ(x 0 ). Now we observe that if the normal derivative of φ is positive then the minimum in the ball of radius ǫ is contained in Ω since it is located in the direction of −∇φ and hence we can argue as before. In fact, we have,
Now, considerx ǫ 2 = 2x ǫ − x ǫ 2 the symmetric point of x ǫ 2 with respect to x ǫ . We go back to (4.5) and use the Taylor expansions of second order,
and
by the definition ofx ǫ 2 . Then, we can divide by ǫ 2 and use (4.13) to obtain −∆ ∞ φ(x 0 ) ≥ 0. In this case, for ǫ small enough we have that ∇φ(x ǫ ) = 0 points inwards as well. Thus,
while x 2 ∈ Ω ∩ B ǫ (x ǫ ). Indeed,
We have the following first-order Taylor's expansions, This ends the proof.
Remark 11. The previous argument fix an inaccuracy in the proof of Theorem 1 in [8] where it was omitted the error term η(ǫ). This omission was also pointed out in [2] where the authors develop a regularization technique which also could fill the gap.
Appendix
In this appendix we prove a compactness result, which is a variant of the classical Ascoli-Arzela's Lemma. Note that the involved functions need not be continuous, but they have a uniform modulus of continuity for points that are not too close.
Theorem 3. Let {u ǫ } be a sequence, u ǫ : Ω → R, such that, (1) u ǫ is uniformly bounded, |u ǫ (x)| ≤ K for all x ∈ Ω.
(2) There exists a sequence a ǫ → 0, and a uniform modulus of continuity ω(s) such that, if |x − y| > a ǫ , then |u ǫ (x) − u ǫ (y)| ≤ ω(|x − y|).
Then, there exists a subsequence {u ǫ j } that converges uniformly in Ω to a continuous function u(x), that verifies |u(x) − u(y)| ≤ ω(|x − y|).
Proof. First, we find a candidate to be the uniform limit u. Let X ⊂ Ω be a dense numerable set. By a diagonal procedure we can extract a subsequence of u ǫ , u ǫ j (x), that converges for all x ∈ X. Let u(x) denote this limit (note that at this point u(x) is defined for x ∈ X.
Moreover, we have that, given r, s ∈ X, there exists an index j 0 such that, if j > j 0 then |r − s| > a ǫ j , and therefore |u ǫ j (r) − u ǫ j (s)| ≤ ω(|r − s|).
Taking limits as ǫ → 0 we get |u(r) − u(s)| ≤ ω(|r − s|).
Hence, we can extend u to the whole Ω, continuously (keeping the same modulus of continuity ω).
Our next step is to prove that u ǫ converges to u pointwise. Given z ∈ Ω, fix, x ∈ X such that |x − z| < δ 0 , with ω(δ 0 ) < δ/3. We have |u ǫ j (z) − u(z)| ≤ |u ǫ j (z) − u ǫ j (x)| + |u ǫ j (x) − u(x)| + |u(x) − u(z)|.
For j large enough, |x − z| > a ǫ j , and then the first term in the right hand side is less or equal to ω(|x − z|). The same estimate is valid for the third term and hence, |u ǫ j (z) − u(z)| ≤ 2ω(|x − z|) + |u ǫ j (x) − u(x)| ≤ 2δ/3 + |u ǫ j (x) − u(x)| ≤ δ, for j large enough. Now, we prove uniform convergence. We argue by contradiction. Assume that there exists a constant M > 0 such that we can find two sequences {ǫ j } and {z j } ⊂ Ω such that M < |u ǫ j (z j ) − u(z j )|.
Since Ω is compact, we can assume z j → z, and then we obtain, M < |u ǫ j (z j ) − u(z j )| ≤ |u ǫ j (z j ) − u ǫ j (z)| + |u ǫ j (z) − u(z)| + |u(z) − u(z j )|.
The second and third terms go to zero as j → ∞, hence to get a contradiction it is enough to estimate the first term.
Fix s ∈ Ω such that |s − z| < M/4, but |s − z| > a ǫ j for j > j 0 . Then we have, |u ǫ j (z j ) − u ǫ j (z)| ≤ |u ǫ j (z j ) − u ǫ j (s)| + |u ǫ j (s) − u ǫ j (z)| ≤ ω(|z j − s|) + ω(|s − z|) < M/2, from where we obtain the desired contradiction.
